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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on microeconomic incentives set in motion by Federal
Reserve decisions about how to implement the reserve—requirement and pricing—
of—service provisions of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (the DIDMC Act). These incentives promise
to reshape the production and character of correspondent—banking services,
the margin of jurisdictional competition between state banking regulators
and the Federal Reserve System, and ultimately the regional structure of
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Although it is convenient to think of the Federal Reserve System as a
unified agency, it is in fact a decentralized bureau with 50 offices. The Fed's so—
called head office is the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C. The System's
partly autonomous regional divisions consist of 12 district Reserve Banks, whiéh
coordinate in turn the work of 25 branches, 11 regional check—processing centers
and a communications center. The Fed's decentralized structure was conceived
originally as the solution to a political problem: quieting populist fears that the
U.S. central bank would come to be dominated either by Wall Street (i.e.,
financial interests) or by Washington, D.C. (i.e., elected federal politicians).
Fear of centralized government has long since been overtaken by concern
for accountability and cost-effectiveness in government activities. With this
shift in national priorities, the political rationale for the Fed's decentralized
structure has become inoperative. Over the last 50 years, just as the federal
government consolidated its authority over the individual states, the Board of
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Governors asserted practical sovereignty over the 12 Reserve Banks. In the
process, the justification for the Fed's regional structure moved quietly from the
political to the economic dimension. In practice, Reserve Banks emerged as
convenient facilities for organizing, producing, and delivering central—banking
payments services. Administratively, this diiision of 1bor had the further
advantage of freeing the Board and its staff to concentrate on the more-
glamorous tasks of making macroeconomic and regulatory policy.
This paper points out that Fed decisions about how to implement the
reserve-requirement and pricing-of--service provisions of the DIDMC Act —the
semi-pronounceable acronym for the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 —nowthreaten to undermine even the economic
justification for System decentralization. These decisions set in motion incen-
tives that will encourage paper instruments used in regionally based local and
within—district transactions to shift into collection channels outside the aegis of
the Federal Reserve System, while encouraging regionally footloose and inter-
regional transactions into electronic forms. As telecommunications make on-
line bank—to-bank connections increasingly economical, concern for economy in
government will eventually require politicians to consolidate the regional struc-
ture of the Federal Reserve System.1"
Changes in Fed Powers and Responsibilities Mandated by the DIDMC Act
This paper concerns itself with Title I of the DIDMC Act. Although this
section of the Act is known as the "Monetary Control Act," we argue that its
provisions have more to do with depository-institution control and Federal
Reserve independence than with monetary control p se. By empowering the
Fed to set reserve requirements for all depository institutions, the Act extends
the sphere of Federal Reserve control to cover more than 35,000 nonmemberp. . —.
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depository institutions. At the same time, it imposes a series of new obligations
on Fed officials. First, it mandates that Fed-produced correspondent-banking
services be made available to any depository institution that wishes to use them.
Second, it requires that Fed officials set explicit prices for these services.
Finally, among its other provisions, this section of the Act specifically directs
the Fed to recover all direct and indirect costs attributable to Federal Reserve
float.
-
Whileother titles of the Act set up mechanisms for easing longstanding
government restrictions on the competitive behavior of U.S. depository institu-
tions, on balance this title is restrictive. Although it promises to reduce reserve
requirements for member banks, it sweeps thousands of nonmember deposit
institutions for the first time into the Fed's regulatory net. Henceforth, every
depository institution that offers interest-bearing third—party payment accounts
or nonpersonal time deposits must meet reserve requirements determined by the
Fed.
Congress did not expand the Fed's reserve—requirement powers arbitrarily,
without Fed support and connivance.In agreeing to extend the System's
jurisdictional reach, Congress answered a long series of Federal Reserve
Chairmen's prayers. The Fed high command had long complained that it lacked
the statutory powers to arrest an uncomfortable secular decline in the number of
member banks and in the percentage of total commercial-bank assets lodged in
these banks. To persuade Congress that the Fed needed to extend its regulatory
dominion, Fed officials repeatedly claimed that, in times of high market interest
rates, deposit institutions and fund-raising techniques outside the Fed's direct
span of control were increasingly able to blunt the anti-inflationarythrust of
traditional forms of monetary restraint.4
In the modern theory of regulation (Stigler, Posner, Peltzman, Becker,
Kane, 1977 and 1981) the statutory configuration of economic regulation is
determined by incumbent politicians' self—interest, as conditioned by their
perception of the balance of political pressures for wealth redistribution. The
Fedts membership problem and its new authority to place reserve requirements
on nonmember deposit institutions are best viewed as stages in a larger
dialectical process driven by economic and political arbitrage. Before Congress
could seriously consider answering the Federal Reserve's prayers, it had to think
through the political effects of alternative responses. Many different interest
groups had a stake in the solution and would be affected quite differently by
alternative regulatory adjustments. The issues in the distributional conflict
focused on effects of alternative reserve-requirement structures on implicit
federal revenue, on different classes of deposit institutions, on deposit-institu-
tion customers, on the regulatory domain of state banking departments, and on
the political clout of the Fed itself. To appreciate the solution adopted in the
DIDMC Act, we must understand the problems from which the Fed sought relief
and the balance the Act strikes between opposing interests on each of the
principal issues of distributional conflict.
To provide analytic perspective on the desirability of pricing the Fed's
correspondent services, we begin by identifying the various components of the
opportunity cost of Fed membership. During the 1960s and 1970s, secularl,
rising interest rates associated with accelerating inflation raised this cost,
intensifying two kinds of competition: (1) between the Fed and state banking
departments for regulatory jurisdiction over state—chartered banks, and (2)
between the Fed and correspondent banks for interbank deposit balances.
While recognizing that the Fed's membership problem has political, mone-
tary-control, and tax dimensions, in the final analysis member-bank departures5
from the System symptomized a spillover into the market for correspondent—
banking services of competition between the Fed and state-banking departments
for regulatory jurisdiction over state-chartered banks. This paper focuses on
how the compromises embodied in the DIDMC Act promise to reshape the
market for correspondent-banking services, the competition between state
banking regulators and the Fed, and ultimately the regional structure of the Fed
itself.
The Fed's Membership Problem: The Ultimate Determinants of Reserve
Requirements
During the 1960s and 1970s, the steady loss of members posed two kinds of
political and monetary-control problems for Fed officials (Kane, 1980). On the
policy-selection front, the decrease in membership eroded the Fed's political
base, undermining its ability to resist pressure from incumbent politicians
pushing for inflationary policy actions.' On the policy-execution front, fear of
speeding up the ongoing deterioration in Fed membership made System officials
slow both to raise its discount rate or existing reserve requirements and to
extend reserve requirements or deposit-rate ceilings to emerging deposit substi-
tutes (such as offshore funding) developed by member banks to compete for funds
effectively in the face of monetary restraint.
Reserve Requirements As a Tax
Declining membership in the Federal Reserve System traced to the impact
of accelerating inflation (and the increasing nominal rates of interest this
implies) on the costs and benefits of membership to individual banks and on the
intensity of industry competition for correspondent balances and other customer
funds. A definitive analysis of this process is offered by Benston (1978).
Although Federal Reserve pronouncements determinedly emphasize the macro—6
economicrole reserve requirements play as devices for influencing growth paths
of monetary aggregates, microeconomically they function as selective excise
taxes on deposits that may also be interpreted as a form of implicit taxation on
deposit—institution profits.If restrictions on an institution's ability to pursue
profitable opportunities are binding, they take potential incomefrom the
institution and/oritscustomers by force of law. Revenues from the reserve-
requirement tax and from the Fed's monopoly on currency issue accrue tothe
Fed in the form of the interest it earns by investing reserve balances in
government securities. After meeting its expenses, the Fed turns mostof its
remaining income over to the Treasury. In 1979, the so—called Fed "interest
payment to the Treasury" was $9.3 billion.
In implicit as well as in explicit taxation, analysts must distinguish between
effective and statutory tax rates and recognize the role that penalties play in
securing compliance. Fed officials have tight control only over the statutory
structure of differential reserve requirements and may resort only to a limited
set of nonretroactive civil sanctions to enforce them. Because it is relatively
easy to dream up low-requirement (and evennonreservable) deposit substitutes
and because reserve requirements can not be imposed on a new instrument until
after recognition and administrative lags, the costs to member banks of avoiding
reserve requirements are in the long run both low and predictable. Exemption
from reserve requirements was particularly secure in cases (e.g., bankers
acceptances and federal funds) whe're the Federal Reserve had proclaimedits
desire to develop broad markets in the instruments involved (Eisenbeis, 1980).
Through the process of substituting low-requirement liabilities for high-require-
ment ones, the response of deposit institutions, their customers, and unregulated
competing institutions ultimately determines the effective strueureof reserve
requiremeniS.4.
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Ina free society, a degree of voluntariness is inherentin every system of
differential taxation. But before the DIDMC Act, member banks' optionto
withdraw from the Federal Reserve System added a second dimensionto the
voluntariness in the reserve—requirement tax system. Fed officialshad to
concern themselves with tracking and controllingthe components of what we
may call the "net disincentive to membership."
Components of the Membership Disincentive
Whether an individual bank should alter its membership status dependsboth
on the balance of continuing costs and benefits thatmembership offers to it and
on the transition cost of effecting a change in status.For national banks, the
transition cost of becoming a nonmember includes the expense andtrouble of
switching to a state charter and the public-relationseffects of removing
"national" from the bank's name. No bank should become a memberunless the
balance of continuing benefits and costs is positive. Similarly, no bankshould
remain a member if the present value of continuing membership costsexceeds
the sum of the transition cost and the present value of its continuing membership
benefits.
Abstracting from transition costs, the net disincentive to membership may
be described as a function of three sets of determinants:
1. Elements that determine the gross burdens of membership.
2. Service offsets to this burden that are offered by the Fed;
3. Opportunity costs of alternative forms of holding reserves.
The gross burdens of membership consist of two opportunity costs:the
cost of holding Federal Reserve stock and the cost of conforming tothe Fed's
schedule of reserve requirements. In the short run, both costs vary directlywith
market rates of interest. The cost of reserve requirements also varieswith the8
distance between (1) Fed requirements and enforcement practicesand (2) the
reserve-requirement structure and penalties enforced bythe banking commission
in the bank's home state. Whether governed by Fed orstate requirements, a
bank systematically endeavors to lighten its reserveburden by exploiting
opportunities to make advantageous adjustmentsin the composition of its
liabilities and in the form in which it holds its reserves.
Offsetting the gross burdens of membershipis the net value of the
formerly "free" Fed correspondent services used bythe bank. This value depends
on the level and mix of the bank's particularservice needs. Compared to fees
charged for correspondent services by commercial banks,membership benefits
have traditionally been thought to be of minor value tosmall banks.! The value
of the Fed's service offset is increased by improvementsin the availability of
transit items and reduced by explicit or implicit service chargesset by the Fed.
Before the DIDMC Act, the Fed's explicit service charges were zero.Implicit
charges refer to the costs of complying withaccess-to-service provisions such as
deadlines for depositing collection items and requirements thatitems be fine-
sorted by destination. It includes the value to the bank of the optionto borrow
from the Fed's discount window and of any leverage that membership mayconfer
with respect to the outcome of Fed regulatory decisions, particularlyon holding-
company and merger applications. Managersof large member banks believed
that leaving the System would adversely affect the Board'sfuture willingness to
allow their banks to expand operations under the provisionsof the Edge Act and
the Bank Holding Company Act. Also, it is hard for nonmemberbanks to solicit
much correspondent business from national-bank respondents(because national
banks may place only a small percentage of their depositsin nonmember
correspondent banks) and a few state-chartered banks mayhave believed that9
membership helped them to garner favorable actions from the Board under the
Bank Merger Act.
Finally, exogenous movements in the marginal opportunity cost of different
forms of holding reserves affect both the optimal composition of a bank's reserve
balances and its optimal liability structure. Increases in interest rates tend to
raise the gross burden of membership for given reserve composition and liability
structure and, by increasing the volatility of a bank's liabilities, to increase the
level of implicit interest that can be earned on balances due from correspondent
banks. Increases in implicit interest consist either of expansions in the quantity
of services offered in exchange for a given level of deposits or of reductions in
the level of supporting—balance requirements necessary to purchase a given level
of correspondent services.
Why Fed Reserve Requirements Are Not A Redundant Policy Instrument
Fed officials have repeatedly testified about their concern for countering
unfavorable trends in membership. This suggests that the agency's goal function
includes, in addition to traditional indices of the state of the national economy,
some index of membership penetration of the banking industry. Considered as an
opportunity cost, the membership disincentive has a number of components, only
two of which (service benefits and requirement structure) are directly controlled
by the Fed. To counter unfavorable movements in membership penetration
occasioned by increased interest rates, reductions in effective reserve require-
ments in individual states, or increased offers of implicit interest by correspon-
dent banks, Fed officials must be prepared to adjust its offer of service offsets
and its structure of reserve requirements.
The Fed's interest in stabilizing membership precludes it from treating
reserve requirements as part of its permanent kit of macroeconomic instru-10
ments. Except in the very short run, Fed reserve requirements are set in
response to competition, i.e., by political and microeconomic forces largely
beyond its control. Whenever the financial environment changes, self-interested
actions by respondent banks, correspondent banks, and state banking commissions
change the statutory structure of reserve requirements and offsets that is
optimal from the Fed's own point of view. In long-run general equilibrium, the
effective level of reserve requirements is market-determined.
Member banks' exit option restricted the Fed's ability to make statutory
reserve requirements stick and put it inescapably into the correspondent-banking
business. Before the DIDMC Act, in regulatory rule-making and in pursuing
stabilization objectives, Fed officials dared not view member banks as a
subservi-ent clientele. Because they had to compete for regulatory jurisdiction
against state banking authorities and the FDIC, Fed officials have had to
consider more closely than central bankers in other countries even the short-run
benefits and costs their actions visit on individual commercial banks. This
concern explains a number of distinctive elements in the framework of U.S.
central-banking policy as schemes for paying implicit interest on bank reserves.
I have in mind such regulatory details as the System's movement to a progressive
structure of reserve requirements (including adjustments in the definition of
what constitutes a "deposit"), its adoption and continued use of a macroeconomi-
cally counterproductive system of lagged reserve accounting, its adherence to a
maximal two—day delay in the availability of uncollected items which forces the
Federal Reserve to make interest-free loans to member banks, its creation of
seasonal borrowing privileges, its discriminatory "surveillance" of individual-bank
use of what in most phases of the interest—rate cycle have been subsidized
opportimities for borrowing at the Fed discount window, and the substantial11
recent expansion in the quantity and quality of the subsidized services it offers
to member banks.
Notwithstanding textbook claims to the contrary, the Fed's statutory
authority to set reserve requirements cannot, except at brief and infrequent
intervals, be exercised arbitrarily. Decisions about the level and structure of
reserve requirements are shaped by an interplay of economic and political forces
that I call the "regulatory dialectic" (Kane, 1977 and 1981).
The Regulatory Dialectic
Accelerating inflation raises the opportunity-cost burdens imposed by statu
tory banking regulation. When nominal interest rates rise, differential elements
in pre-existing regulation inevitably open up opportunities for arbitrage. Incen-
tives exist for financial institutions of all types to reconsider regulatory
affiliation and to expand the production of nonreservable deposit substitutes.
Whatever set of statutory requirements the Fed sets, deposit institutions,
customers, and unregulated competitors must be expected to rearrange their
accounts to optimize with respect to effective changes in their opportunity set.
Avoidance activity includes actions taken by regulated institutions and their
customers to minimize the effective burden of statutory requirements. The
concept also covers induced invasions of regulated markets by nontraditional
competitors.
The displacement of traditional banking business into new institutions and
new contractual forms determines the structure of effective requirements and is
subject itself to a subsequent round of statutory review and political counter-
action.Regulatory avoidance typically makes some form of re-regulation
politically optimal. Deposit institutions and customers that feel the net burden
on them is too heavy would bring political pressure for statutory relief directly12
and indirectly on Fed officials. This pressure would take the form of public-
relations and lobbying activity aimed at building a coalition among Fed officials
and incumbent politicians for an alternative regulatory strategy. On the other
hand, political forces favoring a strategy of high effective reserve requirements
would push for extending the reserve-requirement tax to nondeposit bank
liabilities or to previously unregulated institutions. The statutory outcome of
such lobbying activity inevitably kicks off fresh rounds of avoidance and re-
regulation.
Competition for Bankers Balances
Besides directly raising the opportunity costs of reserves, rising interest
rates stimulate correspondent-bank competition for interbank balances.In
recent years, to counter the effects of rising interest rates, Fed officials
generally lowered statutory reserve requirements and expanded the supply of
subsidized services for member banks. At the same time, they lobbied Congress
for new powers, particularly for a system of universal reserves. Frustrated by
legislative inaction, in 1978 FRB Chairman Miller went so far as to threaten that
the Fed would on its own authority pay interest on member-bank reserve
balances.
Dimensions of Competition from Private Correspondents
In principle, respondent banks can purchase serviqes from correspondent
banks either by contracting to pay explicit service charges or by holding a
deposit balance large enough to compensate the correspondent implicitly. In
almost every state, reserve—requirement statutes count balances due from other
banks the same as "cash." Some states count cash items in the process of
collection (CIPC) arid even marketable securities as well.13
Balances due from correspondents have a dual productivityfor nonmember
banks. Paying for correspondent services withdue—from balances allows a
nonmember bank to earn implicit interest at the market rate on reservebalances
requirçd by its home state. On the supplyside of the market, neither the Fed
nor private banks could pay explicit interest ondemand balances due to domestic
banks.They had to compete by offers of implicitinterest instead.In
competitive markets, implicit interest paymentswould take the form of lowering
fees and/or expanding the range of available correspondentservices when and as
the value to the correspondent of the customerbankTs balances increase. The
key point is that competition among correspondentsfor nonmember banks' due-
from balances must assure that, in equilibrium, reservebalances would be as
productive in risk—adjusted after-tax yield asvault cash or any earning asset.
Supplier competition in the market for correspondentservices must make due-
from balances earn, at the margin, the going implicit rateof return. Moreover,
responding to customer demands for transactionsservices and the structure of
fees for robbery and burglary insurance, nonm ember banksmust adjust their
holdings of vault cash until they earn the same implicit yield.
In markets where the Fed and private suppliers compete equally,the supply
price of correspondent services —i.e.,implicit or explicit pporting-balance
requirem—shoUld have been the same at the marginfor each type of
producer. To recognize that a wider arrayof services is available from private
correspondents and available as well on moreflexible terms,-" competitive
pricing would require that supporting balancesset by private suppliers slightly
exceed reserve requirements established by the Fed. Typesof deposits on which
Fed reserve requirements exceed supporting requirementsat private banks would
be burdened by an implicit tax. On the other hand,deposits on which14
correspondent supporting requirements greatly exceedFed requirements would
be receiving a net subsidy.
While the development of a longstanding membership problem guarantees
us that the Fed was imposing a net tax on atleast one type of deposit, it is not
at all clear that its reserve requirements wereburdensome across the board.
Using the model and data set described inthe next section, two colleagues and I
estimated that in 1974-1975 Fed reserve requirements wereuniformly burden-
-someonly for time and savings accounts (Kane, Castner,and Peterson). As this
account category loomed larger and larger on bankbalance sheets, so did the
size of the membership problem facing the Fed. In accordwith our criterion for
Fed reserve requirements to be competitive, correspondent requirementsfor
due-from balances to support ordinary demand-deposit accountsat different
sizes of banks prove to be slightly in excess of the statutoryratios set by the
Fed. Finally, supporting-balance requirements on balancesowed to other banks
and to the U.S. Treasury greatly exceeded Fed reserverequirements. Our
analysis indicates that these accounts were beingsubsidized.
As a sensitivity test, this quantitative pattern of supporting-balance
requirements at private correspondents wasconfirmed for a parallel sample of
member banks in unpublished regressions run for me byFederal Reserve Board
personnel. Presumably, when acting as correspondentsfor other banks, member
banks would channel much of their activity throughtheir Fed accounts. Consis-
tent with this presumption, supporting balances imposed onmember-bank due-to
balances (though slightly higher) proved much the same asthose imposed on
other demand deposits.In turn, estimates of supporting balances on other
demand deposits and on time accounts were comparable tothose found for
nonmember banks. This supports the notion that the high working-balance15
requirements observed for volatile depositSat nonmember banks reflects the rich
menu of services that theseaccounts generate. It is also consistentwith the
view that, for banks located instates where CIPC is not counted as legal
reserves, a high percentageof due-from balances may representuncollected
funds. Taken together, these hypothesesserve to reconcile our resultswith
Benston'S finding that Fed servicesubsidies to correspondent banks areshifted
forward, so that the burdenof membership falls "rather evenly" onbanks of
different deposit size (Benston, p. 55).
Econometric Analysis of Implicit Pricingin the Market for Correspondent
Services
Model of Working-Balance Requirements.Our analysis defines the ith
nonmeniber bank's holdings of vaultcash and due-from balances, R, asthe
working-balance equivalent of reservebalances recognized by the Fed (cf.
Gambs). We hypothesize thatnonmember banks vary their holdingsof the
reserve-eligible assets defined intheir state's banking law to minimizethe
potential net burden of state reserverequirements. Our analysis focuses on
respondent banks' individual responseto exogenous demands fortransactions
services from depositors and exogenousprices for wholesale transactionsser-
vices set in the correspondentbaflkigmarket. We assume that the volumeof
correspondent services that anonmember bank demands varies inverselywith the
price of correspondent servicesand directly with market interest ratesand its
customers' aggregate deposit activity.Since neither customer servicedemand
nor correspondent prices aredirectly observable, we resort to proxyvariables.
We assume that the volumeof correspondent and currencyservices
purchased for deposit customersdepends on the level and mixof customer
deposit balances. To simplifythe analysis, we distinguish just threecategories
of deposits:16
1. "volatile" deposits, Dv, defined as the sum of interbank and Treasury
accounts;
2. other demand deposits, D0;
3. time and savings accounts, DT.
Making use of Hicks' composite-good theorem, our choice of proxy for the price
of corresponient and currency services can be justified by imposing the following
identifying assumptions on wholesale and retail payments technology:
1. every class of accountholder is offered a specific mix of account
services;
2. thevolumeof correspondent and vault—cash services offered to account
holders is proportionate to the amount of deposits in each class.
Our analysis conceives of working-balance requirements on each type of
deposit —by,b0, bT —
asa set of implicit prices appropriate for the mix of
services demanded. These prices are determined exogenously by payments
technology and by competition in the market for correspondent-banking services.
In our model, a nonmember bank adjusts its working balances, R, both to
comply with state reserve requirements and to deliver a target level of trans-
actions services to accountholders of each type. The bank's goal is assumed to
be to maintain an exogenously targeted time path for deposits, given supporting-
balance and currency requirements, and subject to exogenous changes in its
reserve position and in the level of interest rates. Because of differences in
state reserve requirements and variation in opportunity costs, the level of
transactions services offered could vary systematically across banks and across
time.
Respondent banks supply working balances, customers and correspondent
banks demand them. Customers demand them indirectly by valuing the services17
performed by these balances and correspondent banks directly demand due-to
balances as an implicit price for performing correspondent services. We
explained previously that correspondent-bank competition for nonmember-bank
reserye balances makes them as productive at the margin as any otherbank
asset. To convert this intuitive argument into a partial-equilibrium model of
respondent-bank portfolio equilibrium, we assume that Rshifts exogenously with
a bank's current funding needs. We present the following conditional modelof
.th . . S
the! bank's instantaneous supply of working balances, R:
Rmax(Zs..D..,R)IRS), (1)
1 J1J1 1 1
where s represents effective liquid-reserve requirements in the bank's home
state on the 1th class of deposits at theth bank and R1 fR represents customer
and correspondent demand for working balances when R is made exogenously
available by bank i. As we have explained, working balances required by the
bank's home state can only momentarily exceed working-balance demand. This is
because the marginal return earned on the differential amount of working
balances would be zero. Any level of working balances that takes its place as
part of a respondent bank's equilibrium portfolio must lie simultaneously on the
demand function for the bank's working balances, R
If a random portfolio disturbance were suddenly to lift above the
conditional demand for it, the bank would act immediately to raise its marginal
return on working balances to the anticipated risk-adjusted, after-tax rate of
return on other assets. To accomplish this, bank i would undertake two types of
balance-sheet adjustments:
1. It would adjust its mix of liabilities (shifting its funding from hihs
into low-s1 categories) and it would lower the effective s by expand-
ing its holdings of reserve-eligible earning-asset substitutes for working
balances;18
2.It would transfer working balances from vault cash to due-from
balances.Becauseof due-from balances' value to correspondent banks,
competition among these banks forces due-from balances to earnthe
market yield.
Full portfolio equilibrium is possible only when R1 =R1jR. Econometrically,
this condition serves as an identifying restriction. If we assumethat financial
transactions costs are negligible for banks, the working-balancedemand curve
can be estimated by ordinary least squares.
Our most parsimonious model of working-balance demand neglectsinter-
est-rate effects.It expresses R as a linear reduced form in the exogenous
variables Dv, D0, and DT:
=a+ bvDv. + b0D0. + bTD + Ui. (2)
This model may be given an accounting interpretation. Within the sampleof
data from which its parameters are estimated, the slope estimatestell us the
average level of supporting currency anddue-from balances on each class of
deposits. The intercept a represents the average amountof working balances
explained by omitted variables, i.e., by nondeposit sourcesof bank demands for
correspondent and currency services. R is defined as the sumof the bank's
balances due from other banks, RD, and vault cash, Rc; u represents a
stochastic error term.
Richer models of the working-balance demand equation allow correspon-
dent banks to vary working-balance requirements inversely withtwo other
variables which are also assumed to be exogenous: (i) the individual bank'sflow
of funds in the process of collection (which serves as an additional sourceof
liquid funds to suppliers of correspondent services), CIPC1, and(ii) the opportun-
ity cost of interbank balances as represented by thefederal-funds rate, FFR.








In models where either c or d are nonzero, the supporting—balance require-
ments (the b's) themselves may be interpreted as functions of FFR or CIPC.
Unlike possible simultaneity among Dv, D0, DT and R (which would play havoc
with identifiability), this issue can be examined by looking at ordinary-least-
squares estimates of (3). Because estimates of equation (2) and (3) are subject to
substantially richer types of simu1taneous-equaton and omitted-variable bias, it
is pleasant to report that the only noteworthy effect of relaxing restrictions on c
and d is to lower somewhat the estimate of by.
Interpreting the Slope Coefficients of (3).
1. The slope coefficients b, b0, and bT represent the estimated values of
the working-balance requirements imposed against the respective de-
posits. On the basis of the volatility of the underlying accounts and
supposing marginal—cost pricing by correspondent banks, we expect each
b to be positive, with b >b0
>bT
>
2.The sign of the interest-rate coefficient c is ambiguous. On the one
hand, it should reflect reductions in correspondent-bank requirements
associated with increases in the opportunity cost of reserves. On this
interpretation, c should be negative. On the other hand, as an indirect
effect, high interest rates should also make customer deposits turn over
faster, which would increase the amount of currency and clearing
services to be performed for a respondent bank with a given deposit
structure.
3. Many correspondents give depositing banks immediate credit for un-
collected items (Knight, Melton). This practice would bias the b esti-
mates upward (especially b) as compared to Fed requirements. Includ-20
ing CIPC in our regressions may be interprete.d as overcorrecting for
this bias, letting d estimate the percentage of uncollected items
customarily included in R. According to Gibert (1978), CIPC counts as
part of a bank's primary reserves in 16 states. If R and CIPC were
perfect substitutes in meeting balance requirements, d would equal
minus unity.
This treatment constitutes an overcorrection because, where corre-
spondents do not grant immediate credit, respondents' uncollected
items generate funds for correspondents in advance of the time that
they credit them to the depositing bank. Hence, suppliers of correspon-
dent services should be willing to tie supporting—balance relief to a
bank's CIPC volume. Giving a bank credit for its CIPC is a way that
private correspondents can price their services advantageously vis-a-vis
the Fed. This analysis leads to the restriction, —1 <d<0.
The Data Set. As part of a joint Federal Reserve-FDIC study of the
possibility of improving monetary statistics, the FDIC collected daily data on
individual-bank reserve and deposit holdings between June 20, 1974 and May 7,
1975 for a sample of 181 large nonmember banks and between August 22, 1974
and May 7, 1975 for a supplementary sample of 396 small nonmember banks. The
sampling frame defined a large bank as one that at yearend 1973 had total
deposits of at least $100 million. The form that reporting banks employed is
reproduced as Figure 1. The variables we have previously defined aiign with
these reporting categories as follows:
R =sumof RD as entered in column (5) and Rc in column (8).
Dv =sumof entries in columns (1) and (2).



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DT =sumof entries in columns (6), (7A), and (7B).
CIPC =entryin column (4).
Since the FDIC survey developed over 150,000 readingson 9 variables (46
weeks x 7 days x an average of roughly 500 banks),checkingthe accuracy of the
datawasa difficult task. Our primary safeguard againstmisreported data was
to delete every observation that showed a negativeentry in any column. Also,
besides using CIPC as a regressor in some runs, our studyused CIPC values as a
screen for editing out defective reportsand as a way to eliminate a particular
class of reporting errors. Sample banks that reportedzero figures in this column
are presumed to be mistakenly including"cash items" in collected balances due
from other banks (see Knight).
It took almost three years and threeresearch assistants to compile a
satisfactorily edited tape of survey responses. Disaggregatingour sample —over
time and across banks that differ in size or arelocated in states with different
reserve-requirement frameworks —uncoveredadditional evidence of measure-
ment error and nonresponse. The number ofbanks responding to the FDIC survey
varied from week to week and declined on average duringthe life of the survey.
The FDIC never established a mechanism for policing responses.Less than half
of the large nonmember banks in the sample(74 out of 181) filed an accurate
report every week, although 69 of theother laige banks missed no more than a
few weeks. However, only 255 of the 396 smallbanks reported with reasonable
regularity and accuraqy. Rather thanintroduce extraneous gaps or extrapola-
tions, we decided to ignore irregular andinaccurate respondents. Also, because
Saturday and Sunday observations were not reportedconsistently, it seemed w e
to restrict ourselves to Monday-through-Fridaydata.
Two problems developed in disaggregating thedata over time. First, four
weeks of data for January 1975 unaccountablyfailed to be pched and read ont"23
the project tape. Second, splicing small banks into the sample in August 1974
presented awkward problems, which we handle by explicitly testing for a
common structure between small and large banks in the subset of weeks in which
both groups were surveyed. Since banks' demands for correspondent services are
apt to differ qualitatively with bank size and unspecified omitted variables, it is
reasonable to expect to find differences in structure across various subsamples.
Finally, disaggregating the data across groups of states with similar
reserve requirements for demand deposits uncovered a few anomalous estimates
and missing observations that further helped us to sharpen our screening
procedures.
Overall Results. Table 1 presents estimates of model (3) for two different
subsamples: the "minimum-frequency subsamples" of banks that filed accurate
reports in the vast majority of weeks in which their size group was sampled:
1. 143 large banks that filed in at least 39 of the 42 weeks.
2. 255 small banks that filed in at least 28 of the 33 weeks.
The principal qualitative result is that, in these and nearly every run we
performed, by >b0
>bT
>0.Just as we anticipated, suppliers of correspon-
dent services imposed higher balance requirements against a bank's more-volatile
deposits. This is why differences in deposit volatility belong at the center of the
debate over the equity of differential reserve requirements. Even after the Fed
institutes explicit pricing, Fed reserve requirements will be a tax only to the
extent that they force a bank to hold "idle" reserves tliat it would otherwise have
invested at interest. With implicit pricing, universal reserve requirements on
demand deposits would not have imposed a uniform "burden" on all banks.
Because of the structure of correspondent service fees, universal reserve
requirements would have caused less inconvenience to banks whose deposits wereTABLE 1
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS FOR MODEL (2) OF SUPPORTING-BALANCE
REQUIREMENTS AT NONMEMBER BANKS,
USING FDIC SURVEY DATA







Volatile Demand Deposits, D
Other Demand Deposits, D0
Time and Savings Deposits, DT
Federal Funds Rate, FFR
Cash Items in Process of Collection, CIPC
















Note: All Coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5 percent.
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volatile than to those whose deposits rested quietly on their books.This
asymmetry explains why sample-period reserve requirements (listed in Table 2)
bothered some banks more than others.
It is no accident that traditionally nonmember banks were disproportion-
ately smaller and held disproportionately fewer correspondent and Treasury
balances than member banks. Because small banks' deposits are typically less
volatile, they derived fewer direct benefits from Fed services.Even with
graduated requirements, net costs of membership tended to be higher for such
banks. Arguing from revealed preference, it would have cost nonmember banks
more on average to comply with the Fed's schedule of reserve requirements than
such compliance actually cost the average member bank.
Tests of Alternative Model Specifications. Deleting CIPC from the model
forces d in equation (3) to equal zero. Table 3 reports estimates of the CIPC-
deleted model for four subsamples: the two minimum-frequency subsamples and
the "consistent subsamples" of 74 large banks and 166 small banks that filed an
accurate report in every week that their size group was surveyed. We still
include FFR, although we can report that its inclusion or deletion affects the
estimated intercept and b, but not estimated balance requirements forD0 and
DT. CIPC provides a direct measure of the amount of clearing services a barlkts
depositors put through the bank's correspondent system. Recognizing that CIPC
may be simultaneously determined with D (i.e., that CIPC is likely to be highest
for banks with high levels of volatile deposits) helps to explain why the principal
effect of deleting CIPC is to lower by.
A second class of specification experiments focused on differences in
estimated coefficients between the various subsamples of large and small banks.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































while the FFR coefficients do not, the b estimates differ significantly between
the following pairs of subsamples:
1. Consistent small banks versus consistent large banks over the last 33
survey weeks.
2. Minimum-frequency small banks versus minimum-frequency large banks
over the same 33 survey weeks.
3. Consistent small banks versus other minimum-frequency small banks.
4. Consistent large banks versus other minimum—frequency large banks.
The differences between parallel samples for large and small banks suggest that
private suppliers of correspondent services perform a greater range of services
for small banks. In addition, 30 sample banks averaged more deposit balance due
to other banks than due from them. These nonmember banks may be labeled "net
sellers of correspondent services.'1 Substantial differences between the consis-
tent and other minimum-frequency subsamples are observed only for b.
Although this difference might reflect measurement error or nonresponse bias, it
probably indicates that other variables could usefully be included in the
specification.
To investigate this, two other classes of specification experiments were
run. One set looked at day-of--the-week and week-by-week seasonal variation in
estimated coefficients.While the intercepts bounced around a good deal
(presumably capturing seasonal influences), the b coefficients generally fluctu-
ated within the plausible range of values. A final set of experiments grouped
sample banks into subsamples that operated under similar structures of state
reserve requirements. The evidence failed to establish a systematic relation
between any model coefficients and the severity of statutory reserve require-
ments.29
Unbundling Fed Service Charges
Fed-produced correspondent services may be viewed as banking chores
performed for banks and other deposit institutions. In performing these chores,
the Fed finds itself running both a transportation and a communications network.
Interregional clearing of paper instruments and coins puts the Fed into the
courier business and turns the Fed's banks and branches into a nationwide
network of clearinghouses. As electronic substitutes for paper instruments
developed, the Fed was led first into high-speed wire communications and then
into batch processing of magnetic tapes of payments instructions that travel
between so-called automated clearinghouses (ACHs).
In the past, competitive pressures led the Fed to subsidize inferior forms of
funds transfer. The DIDMC Act requires the Fed to set explicit cost—based fees
for a series of services that, by and large, it used to perform for members gratis:
"(1) currency and coin services; (2) check clearing and collection services; (3)
wire transfer services; (4) automated clearinghouse services; (5) settlement
services; (6) securities safekeeping services; (7) Federal Reserve float; and (8)
any new services which the Federal Reserve System offers, including but not
limited to payment services to effectuate the electronic transfer of funds."
So far (specifically, since January 29, 1981), the Fed is charging only for
wire-transfer and net—settlement services. Check-collection and ACH pricing is
currently scheduled to begin on August 1. The proposed fees are reported in
Table4. Target dates for imposing fees on securities and safekeeping services
are set for October, with fees for currency services to follow in January, 1982.
How to reduce or to price float is still up in the air. Float exists because
the Fed has adopted availability schedules that exceed Reserve Banks' collection
capabilities. Float consists of credit the Fed has given to senders of collection- TABLE4 30
FEE SCHEDULE FOR FEDERAL RESERVE COMMERCIAL CHECK SERVICES
in cents per item, effective Aug. 1, 1981
TYPES OF CASH LETTER DEPOSITS (1)
Accepted only from
Institutions located withinAccepted from institutions located in any F.R.
the U.S. office territory office territory (2)
Other Country Package Group Non-
Federal Reserve Office Mixed. Fed City or RCPC Sort Sort MachinablE
Boston (as well as Lewiston
and Windsor Locks) 1.81- 4.29 1.60 1.81 0.42 1.65 5.54
New York 2.87 5.30 2.74 2.87 0.47 9.04
Buffalo, Cramford, and
Utica 1.66 3.99 1.51 1.66 0.79 1.46 6.08
Philadelphia 2.30 4.64 1.79 2.30 0.87 1.98 5.33
Cleveland (as well as
Cincinnati, Pittsburgh,
and Columbus) 1.92 4.16 1.48 1.92 0.82 5.12
Richmond 1.85 4.03 1.39 1.85 0.67 5.54
Baltimore 1.97 4.37 1.67 1.97 0.63 5.86
Charlotte 1.50 3.96 1.29 1.50 0.49 5.24
Columbia 1.52 4.01 1.37 1.52 0.44 4.68
Charleston 1.75 4.10 1.40 1.75 0.52 5.30
Atlanta (as well as
Birmingham, Jacksonville,
Nashville, New Orleans,
and Miami 1.86 4.15 1.46 1.86 0.98 o.13
Chicago 2.94 5.02 2.36 2.94 0.94 6.29
Detroit 1.57 3.93 1.46 1.57 0.56 3.97
Des Moines 1.99 4.17 1.65 1.99 0.73 5.88
Indianapolis 1.50 3.79 1.24 1.50 0.48 3.23
Milwaukee 1.82 4.06 1.41 1.82 0.61 3.59
St. Louis (as well as
Little Rock, Louisville,
and Memphis) 2.51 4.54 2.06 2.51 0.78 5.09
Minneapolis (and Helena) 2.22 4.68 1.80 2.22 0.62 2.10 5.60
Kansas City 2.80 4.67 2.12 2.80 0.45 0.89 7.55
Denver 1.63 3.97 1.24 1.63 0.72 7.98
Oklahoma City 1.90 4.11 1.52 1.90 0.67 6.94
Omaha 1.76 4.06 1.27 1.76 0.46 6.2631
TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)
Dallas (as well as Houston,
San Antonio, and El Paso)2.22 4.64 1.74 2.22 0.80 1.64 7.19
San Francisco (as well as
Los Angeles, Portland, Salt
Lake City, and Seattle) 1.71 4.12 1.54 1.71 0.58 7.99
Consolidated shipment surcharge for
transportation from local F.R. office to
collecting F.R. office (3) 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
(1) Depository institutions should consult with their local Federal Reserve office about the availability
of check services at any F.R. office, since all services are not available at all offices.
(2) Accepted by a F.R. office for presentment to depository institutions located within that F.R. office
territory.
(3) A collecting F.R. office is responsible for presentment of cash letters to the paying institutions in its
territory.
Source: The American Banker, March 26, 1981.32
items thatithas not yet been able to collect from the banks on which the items
are written. In 1980, float averaged $4.2 billion per day.
Rising interest rates increase the value to check writers of delays in
collection. With the Fed absorbing the interest costs of difficult collection
routings, banks have an incentive when interest rates are high to arrange for
their customers to make disbursements from remote locations. To reduce this
incentive, on April 23, 1981, the Board of Governors authorized improvements in
-itshandling of checks that will place some of the onus from float costs on the
writers of checks.
Float can be reduced either by speeding up collection or by delaying
availability. For a given set of fees, faster collection (which could be achieved,
e.g., by changing check writers' incentives or instituting electronic collection of
all but the smallest checks) would improve the quality of Fed correspondent
services, but would presumably also raise Fed costs. Under the DIDMC Act, this
would force the Fed eventually to raise its fees. Cutting back the availability of
uncollected items to match Fed collection capabilities could be achieved
straightforwardly by making only fractional amounts of uncollected items
available to sending banks. While this would reduce incentives for remote
disbursement, it would lower the quality of Fed correspondent service and make
it harder to compete with private correspondents.
In lobbying activity preceding the DIDMC Act, substantial lip service was
paid to substituting explicit Fed income from service charges for the implicit
Treasury revenue to be lost by lowering reserve requirements for member banks.
But in pushing Congress to require the Fed to price its services explicitly,
correspondent bankers had high hopes of shaking loose profitable new business
for themselves. Confident that profit-oriented institutions could outcompete a33
bureaucratic agency, they expected to take away respondent-bank business from
the Fed and to supply profitable instrument—collection, data-processing, and
interbank communications services that thrift institutions would need to admin-
ister their customers' newly authorized NOW accounts.
Although the DIDMC Act focuses on Fed pricing, the Fed's long-run
problem will be to compete. in quality (i.e., in speed and reliability of service).
Private correspondent networks see themselves as playing United Parcel Service
to the Fed's U.S. Postal System. Like the federal postal system, the Fed is the
nation's "clearer of last resort." Also like the Post Office, Federal Reserve
Banks may (as Humphreys' analysis of 1974-76 data indicates) be operating on the
upward-sloping portion of their average—cost curves. Federal Reserve Banks
must underwrite services that are unremunerative if these are necessary to
secure the external economies of a comprehensive national payment system. It
must make sure that collectable items (no matter how intricate) can be collected
and that deposit institutions in all communities (no matter how remote) retain
timely connections to the national clearing system. It is hard to retain an
adequate capacity to handle exceptional tasks (such as instrument returns and
other reconciliation items) and isolated locations while at the same time
maintaining a streamlined system for basic clearing services. In the face of
private—sector competition, the Fed will be hard-pressed to maintain anything
like its current 40-percent share of the correspondent-banking business.
But this does not mean that existing correspondent banks are on their way
to a turkey shoot. For four reasons, traditional suppliers will find the going
tough, too. The analysis presented in the last section indicates that imposing
cost-based explicit fees on the (previously underpriced) services the Fed per-
forms for banks that sell correspondent services will sharply raise these34
institutions' own supply prices. Second, nontraditional competitors are respond-
ing to the market opportunity. Respondent-bankfears of monopolistic pricing by
correspondent banks arid of their potential for penetratinglocal banking markets
is leading small banks to set up local clearing arrangementsand cooperative
regional service organizations. By January, 1981,19 cooperative EFT systems
were operational on a regional basis. Wholesaleinstitutions designed specifically
for local independent banks are already operating in Minnesota,Colorado, and
Nebraska, and are scheduled to open late in1981 in Wisconsin and Ohio.
Nonbank communications and data-processing firms and regionalFederal Home
Loan Banks are hotly pursuing opportunities for processing, clearing,and settling
thrift-institution customers' third—party payments. Suchmultiform competition
should keep correspondent-bank profit margins at normalcompetitive levels.
Third, if Fed efforts to reduce float succeed, theywill substantially reduce the
amount of cash items in process. As we have seen, about50 percent of what are
currently called due-to balances could almost equallywell be classified as cash
items in the process ofcollection.-" Hence, the aggregate amount of due-to-
banks balances around should fall. Fourth, the fee schedulesand state—of-the-art
improvements in facilities that the Fed has proposed suggesta strategy of
concentrating in the long run on the electronic-servicesmarket. Although Fed
officials seem prepared to surrender a great deal of nonelectronicbusiness, the
System is able to draw on its seignorage profitsto subsidize its correspondent-
banking activity. This allows it to fight in ways that privatecompetitors cannot
afford to match for a dominant place in the evolvingnational system of
electronic payment.
Currently the ACH system is owned by 38 regional ACE associat1ons,37 of
which (all but the New York City ACE) are subsidized by theFed (Mitchell).35
Today, ACHs move only about one percent of interregionalclearings. ACH
transactions consist principally of direct deposits of social-securitychecks,
institutional payrolls, corporate dividends, and annuity and pension payments.
The 38 ACHs are linked by means of a Federal Reserve CommunicationsService
known as the FedWire. In January, 1981, the Fedcontracted to upgrade the
technology of this system to expand its capacityand improve its reliability by
incorporating a packet-sw itching approach
Three important competitive transfer systems are ownedand operated by
private parties:'
1. BankWire: This system is owned cooperatively by 190commercial
banks;
2. CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payment System): This system,which
is owned by the New York Clearing House Association, clears respon-
dent transactions through NYCHA members' reserve accounts;
3. SWIFT (Society of Worldwide Interbank FinancialTelecommunications):
This network, which includes foreign as well as U.S. banks, isoriented
toward international payments.
Delays in clearing and in returning exception items throughthe Fed have
boosted use of these private networks and is encouraging the developmentof
direct-send connections between leading correspondent banks indifferent re-
gions. As perhaps the most vocal spokesman for correspondent-bankinterests,
White has repeatedly called attention to these operating problemsand wondered
whether Fed pricing policies are predatory.
Understanding The Fed's Pricing Strategy
That Federal Reserve banks would try to maintain their servicebase (if
need be, even at the expense of payments-system efficiency) is fully predictable36
from the theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen). In each district, Federal Reserve
Bank employees have a definite stake in maintaining the volume of services
performed at district installations.
Along with stretching out the schedule for implementing explicit charges,
the Fed's strategy appears to have three elements. First and most importantly,
the Fed has posted low "incentive prices" on its electronic-funds transfer (EFT)
services: averaging a little more than a penny an item. This was done ostensibly
to promote EFT development but in full awareness that, as long as the Fed can
match the quality of privately produced services, these prices simultaneously
secure a paramount place in the electronic clearing ACH systems. Equally
aggressive is the Fed's proposal to allow floating-rate "earnings credits" on
clearings balances held at Reserve Banks by institutions that anticipate near-
zero levels of required reserves.Just because these credits are openly
announced, doesn't prevent them from being implicit prices. They make deposit
balances at the Fed redeemable against Fed fees for service. Finally, by having
certain regulatory actions rendered at the Reserve Bank level and by deciding to
let its prices for most services vary regionally, the Fed has opened a number of
options by which to counteract poor service performance at particular regional
banks (e.g., as rumored in Dallas, San Francisco, and Atlanta) and correspondent-
bank cherrypicking as it develops.
At the same time, with surveys showing the quality of Fed check-collection
services to have been deteriorating for some time, it may be in the Fed's short—
run interest to shift some of its check-processing workload onto the private
sector. Throughout the middle and late 1970s, the Federal Reserve Board
pressured District Banks to cut their operational staffs. The DIDMC Act
threatens to overwhelm these already-taut staffs with the bureaucratic effort of37
plugging new institutions into their reporting and services system. It is not
feasible for the Fed's staff to monitor and turn aside more than the most
important incursions into the System's payments-system domain by correspon-
dent—bank arbitrage against its service—charge schedule. Even with its nonelec—
tronic correspondent-service workload reduced, System employees may have to
work harder on average than they have in decades. This could create severe
problems of labor relations at Reserve banks and branches.
Fed defense of itspayments-system turf may or may not be in the public
interest. The issue turns on the degree to which the net-settlement phase of the
nation's payment system may be regarded as a public good, at least some of
whose benefits accrue nonexclusively to every member of society. Even though
the Fed is bound to be technically less efficient than profit-making firms in
producing safekeeping and ite rn-collection services, processing information, and
transmitting communications, these services are produced jointly with services
that vitally affect public confidence in the integrity of the U.S. payments
system. At such tasks as insuring against multimillion—dollar fraud, theft, or
sell—interested nonperformance in EFT transactions and assuring nondiscrimin-
atory access to clearing services, the Fed has a distinct comparative advantage.
These guarantees lessen the need for private individuals to expend resources to
collect, verify, or make secure information about the current financial standing
of intermediate parties in a financial transaction. The Fed's vast resources and
its responsibility for preventing sudden fluctuations in base money mean that it
has nearly unlimited funds with which to back up these guarantees. This absolute
credibility establishes a qualitative difference between the quality of Fed
communications and settlement services and comparable services produced in
the private sector.38
While it is reasonable to expect society to value this difference, two issues
remain before public production and the current Fed pricing strategy may be
deemed socially optimal. First, relative to guarantees provided by large private
correspondents, does the public value perfect guarantees sufficiently to cover
the actuarial costs of these guarantees to the Fed (and ultimately through the
Fed, to the general taxpayer). Second, in principle does not the DIDMC Act
require the Fed to charge explicitly for providing these guarantees? So long as
the Fed does not expliciitly include in its service fees the costs of producing
various kinds of insurance against iuiquidity and default, private producers of
EFT clearing and settlement services are at a disadvantage. To compete away
the Fed's traditional correspondent-banking business, they must be that much
more cost-efficient at moving instruments and information.
Administration of Reserve Requirements Under the DIDMC Act
One of the strongest arguments for universal reserves was widespread
dissatisfaction with the competitive inequities fostered by the differential
regulatory treatment of large as against small banks and of banks as against
other deposit institutions. Banks were particularly upset by what they saw to be
the piecemeal extension of bank-like powers to thrift institutions without their
being required to accept an accompanying burden of bank-like regulation. As
evidenced by the Fed's membership problem, bankers were also unhappy with
what —atleast at then-current levels of interest rates —theyregarded as
unreasonably high levels of Fed requirements. The DIDMC Act addressed both
issues.
Under the DIDMC Act, eligible reserve balances may be held as vault cash,
deposits at the Fed, or passthrough accounts at correspondent banks that39
maintain reserve accounts of their own with the Fed.' Reserve requirements
will be 3 percent on nonpersonal time deposits and on the first $25 million of an
institution's transactions accounts. The breakpoint that will apply in future
years is to be indexed to observed deposit growth. Requirements on transactions
balances that exceed the breakpoint are 12 percent.For member banks,
applicable ratios are being phased "down" over the next 3-1/2 years (starting in
November, 1980) to the new lower levels. For purposes of reserve requirements,
banks that left the System after July 1, 1979 (who may be characterized as
"involuntary member banks") are treated the same as members. For other
nonmember institutions, starting in November, 1980, reserve requirements are
being phased "jn" gradually at one-year intervals over the next eight years.
However, in states where NOW accounts are newly authorized (everywhere
outside of New England, New York, and New Jersey), NOW accounts have to bear
the full weight of transactions-account reserve requirements from the word go.
At its discretion, the Fed is empowered to lower the 3-percent requirement all
the way to zero (prior to the DIDMC Act the floor for time and savings deposits
was 3 percent) and the 12 percent requirement as far as 8 percent.
Lest lawyer-like thinking mislead anyone, what is important for the Fed is
its expanded authority to set low requirements, not the narrowing of its
discretionary power at the high end. Market reactions have always limited the
Fed's ability to convert high statutory requirements into high effective ones.
Response of State Banking Commissioners
Many state banking commissioners resent Fed-imposed universal reserve
requirements, viewing them as a federal power play undermining state regulatory
authority over deposit institutions. Ceteris paribus, universal reserve require-
ments do not just eliminate the disincentive to membership. In most states, they40
threaten to reverse the incentive. In any state which has nontrivial reserve
requirements, the DIDMC Act subjects state-chartered nonmember banks to a
dual reporting burden and at some point in the phase-in process would force
these banks to hold larger reserves than comparable member banks. As the Fed's
requirements first took hold, to avoid a "nonmembership penalty," banking
commissioners in Georgia, California, New York, Missouri, Delaware and Penn-
sylvania acted to eliminate or to reduce reserve requirements for nonmember
banks in their states.-
Inthe face of their jurisdictional loss to the Fed under the DIDMC Act,
state legislatures are competing against each other for banking jurisdiction more
directly than ever before. Individual states are openly changing their banking
laws (e.g., in South Dakota and Delaware) to attract out-of-state affiliates of
bank holding companies.' This competition responds to bank managements' desire
to minimize the burdens nationwide that state usury ceilings and state-and-local
taxation place on the net profitability of their domestic operations. Bank efforts
to escape the jurisdiction of states with onerous tax and usury laws is
simultaneously transforming the margin of federal-state regulatory competition
from the issue of membership in the Fed to the designation of what banking
activities may be legally performed by nonbank corporations.
Responses by Deposit Institutions
Whenever and wherever the reserve-requirement burden begins to pinch,
deposit institutions as well as state regulators must be expected to work hard to
alleviate the pain. As we have seen, an individual bank does this by reordering
its activities and rearranging its balance sheet and dominant contractual forms
to keep the effective level of requirements relative to total bank liabilities close
to its voluntary working-balance ratio. The longer any set of differential require—41
ments is held in place, the more successfully banks can shortcircuit its impact.
—Atthe margin, the effective burden from complying with reserve requirements
must equal the incremental cost of avoiding that burden. In the long run, the
marginal costs of avoiding the reserve-requirement tax are very low. Regula-
tion-induced innovation and political pressure combine to make effective reserve
ratios largely voluntary in the long run.
To illustrate how difficult it is to determine the effective reserve-require-
ment tax a priori, we may note that the Kane-Castner-Peterson study of
voluntary ratios at nonmember banks suggests that in the middle 1970ts the net
burden of Fed reserve requirements (i.e., net of the return flow of associated
Fed services) was highest for bona fide time and savings accounts, the very
accounts on which gross requirements are lowest.
One potentially important avenue for alleviating an individual institution's
reserve-requirment burden lies in the so-called "passthrough option" the DIDMC
Act provides to nonmember depository institutions. At its own option, a nonmem
ber institution can pass its required reserves through a correspondent bank, a
Federal Home Loan Bank, or the National Credit Union Administration's Central
Liquidity Facility (Gilbert, 1980). As highlighted in the square-root rule of
inventory theory, a pool of reserve balances managed by a single correspondent
bank can manage a given risk of reserve insufficiency with a much-smaller
aggregate of reserve balances than members of the pool would have to hold on
their own. While the benefits are ameliorated by carryover provisions in reserve
accounting, the incentive for small institutions to make use of passthrough
arrangements (even if they must quit the System to do so) will be very great.
Understanding these incentives helps to explain why the Fed has thus far
deferred (and gone on to propose a permanent exemption from) reserve require—42
ments for nonmember depository institutions whose total deposits are less than
$2 million. It also clarifies the competitive importance to Federal Reserve
Banks of giving service credits (calculated at floating interest rates) to institu-
tions that hold "clearings balances" with the Fed.
Moreover, the DIDMC Act's steeply graduated schedule of statutory
requirements should encourage banks, ceteris paribus, to substitute holding-
company affiliates in multibank systems for ordinary branch offices. This would
multiply the number of low-requirement deposit brackets available to the
stockholders of the consolidated firm. While the Fed can forestall crude spin-
offs of existing branches into holding-company affiliates, it will be difficult to
disentangle (let alone to stop) effects on decisions about future acquisitions or de
novo offices.
Maintaining selectively high levels of reserve requirements on transactions
balances will also encourage banks and their customers to substitute nondeposit
instruments for deposits of all kinds and lower-requirement deposits for high-
requirement ones. The DIDMC Act's reserve-requirement tax will also encour-
age nontraditional and foreign-bank competitors to develop new and improved
substitutes for traditional forms of bank deposits.Subsidized pricing of
electronic payment services, combined with ongoing technological change, will
simultaneously change the forms in which payments can most profitably be
made. These adaptations will hamper monetary policy by making the money
stock that is relevant for policymaking harder to define.
On the other hand, without having to worry about provoking member-bank
withdrawals, under the DIDMC Act the Fed is free to pull innovating instruments
into its regulatory net as soon as they are recognized to be a problem. Last
October, when Citicorp attempted to pay eight-percent interest on positive43
balances in households' credit-card accounts in a Maryland-based affiliate, Fed
officials blocked the scheme before it could get off the ground. Similarly, the
Board of Governors took only three weeks to kill Bank of California's May, 1981
scheme to avoid deposit-rate ceilings by transferring designated small-denomina-
tion accounts to an offshore branch.
Table 5 shows that, during the next few years, nonmember institutions'
operational needs for vault cash should prevent the new requirements from
proving onerous.Except for involuntary members (who are simply being
bureaucratically brutalized), member banks' statutory burdens will lighten stead-
ily. Hence, while the 3 and 12 percent requirements are gradually settling into
place, the Fed will have ample opportunity to gauge —asif by experiment —
regulatees'reactions both to different levels of reserve requirements and to
different definitions of the main classes of reservable liabilities.
As settings of the level and structure of requirements change, Fed officials
can observe variations in the political heat that emanates from different
sources. In this way, they can obtain a good idea of what would, from the
System's point of view, constitute a politically optimal reserve-requirement
framework. By simultaneously observing changes in the rate of regulation-
induced innovation, they can also make judgments about the economic viability
of alternative frameworks. Of course, economic and political pressure against
even a statically optimal reserve-requirement tax system will rise if inflation
keeps accelerating. On the other hand, authorities should be prepared to see the
pressure relent if and when inflation ever decelerates.
Effects on Fed's Policymaking Autonomy
Although the DIDMC Act promises to create a heavy transitional workload
for Fed staffmembers and to threaten the survival of at least a few of the 1244
Table 5
Frequency Distribution of the Conservatively Estimated* Number of
Years Before the DIDMC Act's Reserve Requirements Could
No Longer Be Met on a Daily Average Basis Solely
By Nonmember-Bank Holdings of Vault Cash
Estimated Number Number of Banks Mean Deposit Size
of Years in Data Set (in millions of dollars)






over 6 35 14
Total Sample 482 112
*Calculations are conservative because they assume no room for 1974-1975
balance-sheet ratios to adjust costlessly to the new requirement structure and
because they assume that all personal time deposits are switched to transac-
tions accounts.45
Reserve Banks,1-' it offers substantial political benefits to the Fed's Board of
Governors. It simultaneously enlarges the Board's political clientele and expands
its capacity to tailor reserve requirements on time and savings accounts to the
low levels needed to maintain clientele allegiance.Nevertheless, although
universal reserve requirements greatly increase the Board's short-run policy
options, they mainly change the form of its long-run jurisdictional problem. In
place of fretting about unfavorable trends in membership, the Board will find
itself worrying increasingly about a secular displacement of traditional banking
business to nondepository "financial-services institutions" whose operations lie
similarly outside its traditional regulatory purview.46
FOOTNOTES
1.In October, 1980, Henry Reuss asked the Government AccountingOffice to
study this very issue. Although the GAO reportfound no merit in the
proposal to close district banks at this time, the activitycriteria used to
justify this determination would lead to this reverseconclusion if events
came to pass as predicted in this paper.
2.Burns (1978, p. 430) argued that, by skewing the distributionof membership
toward large banks, membership attrition threatened the politicalsustain-
ability of "the insulation of the Federal Reserve Systemfrom day-to-day
political pressure."
3.See the sources cited and evidence developed in Gilbert(1977). For some
contrary evidence, see Hume and Russell,which examines use of Fed
facilities by a sample of Second District Banks. It may bethat physical
proximity to New York City simplifies a bank'scorrespondent-service
needs.
4.For example, to deposit checks for direct collection bythe Federal
Reserve, a bank must first presort the checks bythe location of the paying
bank and magnetically encode them with the dollar amountand bank
routing numbers involved.
5.Thanks to the linearity property of least-squares estimators, the intercepts
and slopes reported for the R equations which are estimatedhere may be
interpreted as the sums of the corresponding coefficientsfrom separate
Rc and RD regressions onthe same sets of exogenous variables.
6.Knight estimates that only 56 percent of demandbalances due from other
banks are collected balances.
7.packet-switching is akin to putting data tapes on a real-time system
directly connecting Federal Reserve Banks. The "packetsthat are switch-47
ed" are small sets or data into which natural messages are disaggregated.
The "switching" combines packets with other message fragments in transit
in ways that optimize the efficiency of transmissions moving through the
network. The packets are reassembled into the original messages at the
receiving point, much as a fictional teleportation device (such as the Star
Trek transporter) is supposed to reassemble a flow of atoms into the
objects originally dispatched (Mitchell).
8.We deliberately neglect nationwide point-of-sale systems operated by bank
credit—card firms and large retailers.
9.A careful analysis of incentives inherent in the proposed passthro4gh
reserve option is presented by Gilbert (1980).
10.Recognizing that Reserve Bank Presidents have long held 5 voting places
on the Federal Open Market Committee, in the first stage of consolidation
five Reserve Banks might survive. Based on regional interests, New York,
Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta, and Dallas seem the best candidates.
However, the last two locations may be captured as political patronage by
chairmen of Congressional Banking Committees.48
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